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The goals of this paper are to present criteria, that allow to a priori quantify the attack
stability of real world correlated networks of finite size and to check how these criteria
correspond to analytic results available for infinite uncorrelated networks. As a case
study, we consider public transportation networks (PTN) of several major cities of the
world. To analyze their resilience against attacks either the network nodes or edges are
removed in specific sequences (attack scenarios). During each scenario the size S(c) of the
largest remaining network component is observed as function of the removed share c of
nodes or edges. To quantify the PTN stability with respect to different attack scenarios
we use the area below the curve described by S(c) for c ∈ [0, 1] recently introduced
(Schneider, C. M, et al., PNAS 108 (2011) 3838) as a numerical measure of network
robustness. This measure captures the network reaction over the whole attack sequence.
We present results of the analysis of PTN stability against node and link-targeted attacks.
Keywords: complex networks, transportation networks, attack vulnerability
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1. Introduction
Taken the importance of transportation networks in different types of natural and
man-made structures the relevance of their stability against disturbances be they
individual failures or complete breakdown is obvious. In turn, one may single out
two main ingredients which determine this stability, these are (i) dynamical features
of transport processes that take part on such networks, i.e. their fluctuating load and
(ii) structural features of the networks themselves, i.e. their topology [1]. Whereas
a comprehensive treatment of transportation network stability has to deal with
both of these mentioned factors, the complexity of the problem often calls for a
separate account and analysis of each factor. Moreover, recently network structure
stability has become the subject of a separate field of research within complex
network science, where the attack vulnerability of a complex network is treated by
means of a combination of tools of random graph theory [1] and those of percolation
theory [2] and statistical physics [3]. The very notion of attack vulnerability of a
complex network originates from earlier studies of computer networks and reflects
the decrease of network performance as caused by the removal or dysfunction of
either their nodes or links (or both) [4, 5].
The study of network vulnerability against failure or attack has conceptually
much in common with studies of percolation and they gained a lot from concepts
and insights in percolation theory. However, standard percolation theory [2] deals
with homogeneous lattices whereas the non-homogeneity of complex networks gives
rise to a variety of phenomena which are particular for these structures. To give
an example, the empirical analysis of numerous scale-free real-world networks (the
www and the internet [4, 5], metabolic [6], food web [7], protein [8] networks) has
revealed that these networks display an unexpectedly high degree of robustness
under random failure. However, if the scenario is changed towards “targeted” at-
tacks, the same networks may appear to be especially vulnerable [9, 10]. It is the
non-homogeneity of networks that allows to choose different attack scenarios, i.e.
to remove network links or nodes not at random, but following specific sequences
prepared according to characteristics determining their ‘importance’. For vertex-
targeted attacks, the sequence may be ordered by decreasing vertex degree [11, 12]
or betweenness centrality [14] for the unperturbed network and the attack succes-
sively removes vertices according to this original sequence. One may further extend
the above scenarios by recalculating the characteristics of the remaining vertices
after each removal step and reordering the lists [4]. Former analysis has shown that
attacks according to recalculated lists often turn out to be more effective [13, 14].
So far, the prevailing analytic results on complex network stability have been
obtained for idealized models of infinite networks. In particular, important insight
on network structure stability may be gained assuming that a complex network may
perform its function as long as it possesses a giant connected component (GCC) i.e.
a connected subnetwork which in the limit of an infinite network contains a finite
fraction of the network. Under this assumption, the network robustness may be
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judged using the Molloy-Reed criterion, which has been formulated for essentially
treelike networks with a given node degree distribution P (k) but otherwise random
linking between vertices. The criterion for a GCC to be present in such networks is
[9, 10, 15]:
〈k(k − 2)〉 ≥ 0, (1)
where 〈. . . 〉 means the ensemble average over networks with given P (k). Defining
the Molloy-Reed parameter as the ratio of the moments of the degree distribution
κ(k) = 〈k2〉/〈k〉, (2)
one may rewrite (1) as:
κ(k) ≥ 2. (3)
For an uncorrelated network the parameter κ can be equally represented by the
ratio between the mean number z1 of next neighbors (which is by definition equal
to the mean node degree 〈k〉) and the mean number z2 of second nearest neighbors:
κ(z) = z2/z1. (4)
In terms of κ(z), condition (3) can be rewritten as:
κ(z) ≥ 1. (5)
For obvious reasons, relations (3), (5) can not be directly applied to real-world
networks, which usually are correlated and are of finite size. Therefore, an important
issue which arises in the analysis of attack vulnerability of real-world networks is
the choice of the observables which may be used to measure network stability. Since
the GCC is well-defined only for an infinite network, often the size of the largest
network component S is used. Alternatively, one can estimate network stability
from the average shortest path lengths or their inverse values [14, 18]. Recently, a
unique measure for robustness was introduced [16, 17] and has been used to devise
a method to restructure a network and to make it more robust against a malicious
attack. Observing the normalised size S(c) of the largest component as function of
the share c of removed vertices or links a measure of stability is provided by the
area A under the curve for the interval c ∈ [0, 1]. We will normalise this value as
A = 100
∫ 1
0
S(c)dc. (6)
Here, the size of the largest component is normalised such that S(0) = 1. In this
respect, the measure captures the network reaction over the whole attack sequence.
The goal of this paper is to elaborate criteria, which allow to give a priori informa-
tion on the attack stability of real world correlated networks of finite size and to
check how these criteria correspond to the analytic results available for the infinite
uncorrelated networks. As a case study, we consider public transportation networks
(PTN) of several major cities of the world. This paper continues studies initiated
in [18], where we have considered PTN attack vulnerability. The results presented
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Table 1. Some characteristics of the PTNs analyzed in this study. Types of transport taken into
account: Bus, Electric trolleybus, Ferry, Subway, Tram, Urban train; N : number of stations;
R: number of routes. The following characteristics are given: 〈k〉 (mean node degree); ℓmax, 〈ℓ〉
(maximal and mean shortest path length); C (relation of the mean clustering coefficient to that
of the classical random graph of equal size); κ(z), κ(k) (c.f. Eqs. (4), (2)); γ (an exponent in the
power law (7) fit, bracketed values indicate less reliable fits, see the text). More data is given in
[18, 22].
City Type N R 〈k〉 ℓmax 〈ℓ〉 C κ(z) κ(k) γ
Berlin BSTU 2992 211 2.58 68 18.5 52.8 1.96 3.16 (4.30)
Dallas B 5366 117 2.18 156 52.0 55.0 1.28 2.35 5.49
Du¨sseldorf BST 1494 124 2.57 48 12.5 24.4 1.96 3.16 3.76
Hamburg BFSTU 8084 708 2.65 156 39.7 254.7 1.85 3.26 (4.74)
Hong Kong B 2024 321 3.59 60 11.0 60.3 3.24 5.34 (2.99)
Istanbul BST 4043 414 2.30 131 29.7 41.0 1.54 2.69 4.04
London BST 10937 922 2.60 107 26.5 320.6 1.87 3.22 4.48
Moscow BEST 3569 679 3.32 27 7.0 127.4 6.25 7.91 (3.22)
Paris BS 3728 251 3.73 28 6.4 78.5 5.32 6.93 2.62
Rome BT 3961 681 2.95 87 26.4 163.4 2.02 3.67 (3.95)
Sao˜ Paolo B 7215 997 3.21 33 10.3 268.0 4.17 5.95 2.72
Sydney B 1978 596 3.33 34 12.3 82.9 2.54 4.37 (4.03)
Taipei B 5311 389 3.12 74 20.9 186.2 2.42 4.02 (3.74)
below complement Ref. [18] by describing the effects of link-targeted attacks as well
as by applying the above mentioned measure for network robustness [16, 17] to
evaluate attack efficiency.
For the remaining part of the paper we will use the following set-up. In the
next section we will shortly describe our PTN database, attack scenarios and the
observables used to describe different features of the PTNs considered here. Results
for the transportation network stability against node-targeted and link-targeted
attacks will be given in sections 3 and 4, correspondingly. In section 5 we present
some observed correlations between PTN characteristics measured prior to attack
and the PTN stability during attacks following different scenarios. Discussions and
outlook are presented in section 6.
2. Database and attack scenarios description
The systematic analysis of PTN using tools of complex network theory dates back
to the early 2000-s [23] and continues to this day [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24]. It has been
revealed that these networks share common statistical properties: they appear to be
strongly correlated small-world structures with high values of clustering coefficients
and comparatively low mean shortest path values. The power-law node degree dis-
tributions observed for many PTN give strong evidence of correlations within these
networks.
In this work we analyse a selection of PTNs drawing from a database compiled
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by the present authors earlier and described in Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. The choice
for the selection of these PTNs is motivated by the idea to collect network samples
from cities of different geographical, cultural, and economical background. Some
characteristics of these networks are given in table 1. For each selected city the
available information on all different types of public transportation is included.
More data as well as details about the database are given in [18, 22]. As one can see
from the table, the typical number of routes is several hundreds while the typical
number of stops (i.e. network nodes) is several thousands with a mean node degree
of 〈k〉 ∼ 3. This number of network nodes is to be related to comparatively low
values for the mean and maximal shortest path. As mentioned above, the node
degree distribution P (k) for some of the PTN has been observed [18, 22] to display
a power-law decay
P (k) ∼ k−γ , (7)
for large values of the node degree k. Results for the corresponding exponent values
are given in the last column of table 1. If the distribution P (k) is better fitted by an
exponential decay, the exponent corresponding to a power-law fit is given in brackets
(this is the case for seven out of thirteen listed PTNs). As a measure of local network
correlation we give the mean clustering coefficient of each PTN normalised by the
value CER for an Erdos-Renyi random graph with the same numbers of nodes N
and links M , CER = 2M/N
2. Recall that the clustering coefficient C(i) of a given
node (i) is the ratio of the number of links Ei between the ki nearest neighbours of
node (i) and the maximal possible number of mutual links between these:
C(i) =
2Ei
ki(ki − 1)
. (8)
The values of C quoted in table 1 give convincing evidence for the presence of strong
local correlations.
In our earlier work on the PTN resilience to attacks of different types we intro-
duced different scenarios to remove network nodes or links, to model random failure
or attack. However, the focus of that work was primarily on node-targeted attacks.
In previous work [18, 20, 21], the present authors have shown that for PTNs the
most effective attack scenarios correspond to removing nodes (i) either with highest
degree ki or with highest betweenness centrality values CB(i). For a given node (i),
the latter quantity is defined as:
CB(i) =
∑
j 6=i6=k
σjk(i)
σjk
, (9)
where σjk is the number of shortest paths between nodes j and k and σjk(i) is the
number of these paths that go via node (i).
The results presented below show the outcome of node- and link-targeted at-
tacks, where either nodes or links are removed following specific sequences corre-
sponding to so-called scenarios. For node-targeted attacks we concentrate on five
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different scenarios, by selecting the nodes: (i) at random, (ii) according to their
initial degree (prior to the attack) (iii) according to their degree recalculated after
nodes of higher degree have been removed (iv) according to their initial betweenness
centrality (v) according to their recalculated betweenness centrality. The same five
scenarios are implemented for the link-targeted attacks. However, in this case one
has to generalize the notions of node degree and betweenness centrality for links.
We will define the degree k(l) of the link between nodes i and j with degrees ki and
kj as:
k
(l)
ij = ki + kj − 2. (10)
For the simple graph with two vertices and a single link, the link degree will be
zero, k(l) = 0, while for any link in a connected graph with more than two vertices
the link degree will be at least one, k(l) > 1. The link betweenness centrality C
(l)
B (i)
measures the importance of a link i with respect to the connectivity between the
nodes of the network. The link betweenness centrality is defined as
C
(l)
B (i) =
∑
s6=t∈N
σst(i)
σst
, (11)
where σst is the number of shortest paths between the two nodes s, t ∈ N , that
belong to the network N , and σst(i) is the number of shortest paths between nodes
s and t that go through the link i.
The two subsequent sections demonstrate how PTNs react on attacks of the
above described scenarios when these attacks are targeted on PTN nodes (section
3) and links (section 4). To quantify the outcome of these attacks we monitor the
evolution of the normalised size S(c) of the largest network component as function
of the share c (with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1) of removed links or nodes:
S(c) = N(c)/N(0), (12)
where N(0) is the initial number of nodes of the largest connected component while
N(c) is the corresponding remaining number of nodes in that component after a
share c of nodes or links has been removed. Obviously, any network of non-zero size
will have a largest connected component.
3. Node-targeted attacks
The outcome of attacks targeting PTNs nodes has been reported by the present
authors in Refs. [18, 20, 21]. In particular, results of attacks of sixteen different
scenarios have been presented and the most effective ones were singled out. Here,
we recall the results of the five scenarios laid out in the previous section. In partic-
ular, this will allow to compare these with the corresponding link-targeted attack
scenarios (section 4) and analysing these to elaborate criteria for network stability
(section 5).
In figure 1 we show the dependence of the normalized size S(c) (12) of the
largest connected cluster as function of the share c of removed PTN nodes for two
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Fig. 1. Size of the largest cluster S as functions of a fraction of removed nodes c normalized by
their values at c = 0. a. For random node-targeted scenario. b. For recalculated node-degree attack
scenario.
attack scenarios: in the first one, Fig. 1 a the PTN nodes are removed at random,
in the second one, Fig. 1 b the nodes are removed according to the a list of the
nodes ordered by their node degree k recalculated after each step comprising the
removal of 1% of the initial nodes. In the following, we will call this scenario the
’recalculated node degree scenario’. As noted, instead of recalculating the PTN
characteristics after the removal of each individual node, the nodes are removed in
groups of 1% of the initial nodes and the PTN characteristics are recalculated after
the removal of each such group. The random scenario Fig. 1 a presents results of
a single instance of an attack, we have verified, however, that due to the large size
of the PTNs size a certain ’self-averaging’ effect takes place: averaging of S(c) over
many random attack sequences instances do not significantly modify the picture for
S(c) presented in Fig. 1 a. As one may infer from the figures, the individual PTNs
may react on the attacks in very different way, ranging from a gradual decrease
of S(c) as function of c to sudden jumps at certain values of c. A further striking
feature of the plots visualising these scenarios is the qualitative differences seen
between individual PTNs as well as between different attack scenarios.
To further illustrate the reaction of a given PTN to attacks of different type,
we present in Fig. 2 the changes in the largest component size of the PTNs of
Dallas (Fig. 2 a) and Paris (Fig. 2 b) for attacks of five different scenarios, as
described in the former section [19]. For the case of the Paris PTN we observe that
for small values of the share c of removed nodes (c < 7%) these scenarios cause
practically indistinguishable impact on S(c) and S(c) is a linear function of c. As
c increases, deviations from the linear behavior arise and the impact of different
scenarios starts to vary. In particular, there appear differences between the roles
played by the nodes with highest value of k and highest betweenness centrality
CB. Whereas the first quantity is a local one, i.e. it is calculated from properties
of the immediate environment of each node, the second one is global. Moreover,
the k-based strategy aims to remove a maximal number of edges whereas the CB-
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Fig. 2. The normalised largest component size S(c) of the PTN as function of the fraction c of
removed nodes for different attack scenarios. Each curve corresponds to a different scenario defined
by a corresponding sequence of nodes. RV: random vertex sequence; k and ki: sequences ordered
by recalculated and initial degrees; CB and C
i
B
: sequences ordered by recalculated and initial
betweenness. a. Five scenarios for the PTN of Dallas. b. Five scenarios for the PTN of Paris.
based strategy aims to cut as many shortest paths as possible. In addition, there
arise differences between the ’initial’ and ’recalculated’ scenarios, suggesting that
the network structure changes as important nodes are removed. Similar behavior of
S(c) is observed for all PTNs included in this study, while the order of effectiveness
of different attack scenarios may differ between PTNs.
4. Link-targeted attacks
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Fig. 3. The normalised size S(c) of the largest cluster as functions of the share of removed links
for the PTNs of 13 cities. a. Random link-targeted scenario. b. Recalculated link-degree attack
scenario.
A particular feature of link-targeted attacks is that when a link is removed,
the neighbouring nodes survive. Therefore, during the link-targeted attacks all the
nodes survive to the end of an attack, i.e. the number of nodes does not change,
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Fig. 4. Normalized size S(c) of the largest component of the PTN as function of the share c of
removed links for different attack scenarios. Each curve corresponds to a different scenario as
indicated in the legend. Lists of removed links were prepared according to their degree k(l) and
betweenness CB(l) centrality. A superscript i refers to lists prepared for the initial PTN before the
attack; RL and RV denote the removal of a random link and removal of random node respectively.
a. For PTN of Dallas. b. For PTN of Paris.
while the share of the removed links increases. In Figs. 3 and 4 we monitor the
behaviour of the normalised size S(c) for the largest connected component (12) but
now as a function of the removed links following corresponding link-attack scenarios.
Besides removing links at random we will use the sequences ordered according to
link degree and link betweenness centrality, (10), (11) either calculated for the initial
unperturbed PTN (we will indicate the corresponding scenario by a superscript i,
e.g. C
i,(l)
B ) or following sequences with lists recalculated for the remaining links after
each step of removing 1% of the initial set of links.
In Fig. 3 a we show the change of the normalised size S(c) of the largest cluster
under random link-targeted attacks (RL). If one compares this behavior with that
observed for the random node removal scenario (RV) (see Fig. 1 a) one can see,
that for most PTNs with strong resilience to random node-targeted attacks random
link removal is even less effective. On the other hand, for PTN with weak resilience
there seems to be no significant difference. Similar to the random node attacks (RV)
scenarios the random link attacks (RL) lead to changes of the largest connected
component S that range from an abrupt breakdown (Dallas) to a slow smooth
decrease (Paris). The decay is even slower than for random node removal - removing
a link does not necessary lead to removing a node from the largest cluster, while
removing a node from the completely connected network decreases it at least by
one node.
Typical results for PTNs under different types of link-targeted attacks as ap-
plied to the PTNs of Dallas and Paris are displayed in Fig. 4. We show how the
normalised size S(c) of the largest connected component of the Dallas (a) and Paris
(b) PTN varies as function of the share c of removed links following the above de-
scribed attack scenarios. As one can see, there is no significant difference between
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the effectiveness of most scenarios including the random one for the PTN of Dallas.
The vulnerability behavior of the Dallas PTN under link-targeted attacks appears
not to differ from the corresponding random vertex removal approach. For Paris the
situation is quite different. The main observation is that initially the random vertex
attack is more effective than any link-targeted attack, until breakdown and further,
and only once the near to 50% of the links have been removed the recalculated link
degree (k(l)) targeted scenario starts to be more harmful. Comparing different link-
targeted scenarios one notices similar behavior between these, only the recalculated
degree scenario line initially decays slower, however to become more effective near
to the breakdown. In the following section we will compare outcomes of node- and
link-targeted attacks in more detail.
The special behaviour of the recalculated link degree behaviour may be explained
as follows: in each removal step the links with highest link degrees are removed,
However, these may belong to a number of different nodes. The affected nodes will
therefore remain, however, with lower degrees. After recalculation the links on these
nodes affected in the last step will have moved to lower places in the ordered list
such that other links will be affected. This will continue until the degrees of all
nodes have been reduced to three or less. At that point the removal of almost any
link will cut down the connected component and a rapid breakdown of the largest
component takes place.
When the sequence for the removal of links is calculated using the initial degrees
of the vertices, then obviously in the first 1% step a set of all links connected to the
highest degree vertices are removed which is approximately equivalent to removing
the corresponding 1% of all highest degree nodes. As far as no recalculation is
involved the second step will essentially cut the links off the second 1% of highest
degree nodes. Disregarding correlations between these operations one may therefore
expect that the initial link and node degree scenarios result in ‘similar breakdown
behaviour.
5. Robustness measures and correlations
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, different indicators may be used in order
to evaluate network stability. Here, for this purpose we will use a measure, recently
introduced in Refs. [16, 17]. In our case, this measure corresponds to the area
below the curve describing the normlised size S(c) as function of the share c of
removed links, as defined by Eq. (6). As follows from the definition, the measure
captures the effects on the network over the complete attack sequence. It is especially
useful in the analysis of the real-world networks which are of finite size and usually
are not characterized by a single well-defined concentration at which phenomena
analogous to percolation (network clustering) occurs. Instead, the value A is an
integral characteristics, which is well-defined for a finite-size network and is, as we
will see below, nicely suited to compare robustness of different PTN during attacks.
In table 2 we give the value of A for the node- and link-targeted attacks (left and
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Table 2. Robustness measure A, Eq. (6), for the PTNs of different cities as analyzed in this study.
Columns 2-6 give the value of A for node-targeted attacks, columns 7-11 give A for link-targeted
attacks. The results for A for the following attack scenarios are reported – RV: random node;
k : node with maximal recalculated degree; ki : node with maximal initial degree; CB : node
with maximal recalculated betweenness centrality; Ci
B
: node with maximal initial betweenness
centrality; RL : random link; k(l) : link with recalculated maximal degree; ki,(l) : link with maximal
initial degree; C
(l)
B
: link with maximal recalculated betweenness; C
i,(l)
B
: link with maximal initial
betweenness
City Node-targeted attacks Link-targeted attacks
RV k ki CB C
i
B RL k
(l) ki,(l) C
(l)
B
C
i,(l)
B
Berlin 22.71 6.52 7.12 7.27 9.44 31.21 22.27 25.57 29.91 30.92
Dallas 9.81 3.41 3.61 6.07 13.28 11.17 8.94 10.68 11.75 19.58
Du¨esseldorf 25.47 7.45 9.39 8.26 12.65 31.22 23.88 28.69 30.58 31.44
Hamburg 15.82 6.34 6.99 6.53 12.19 20.74 22.49 24.02 20.22 20.47
Hong Kong 31.57 9.99 9.78 6.1 15.0 47.55 41.41 40.17 47.08 34.13
Istanbul 16.05 4.46 5.03 5.62 9.42 18.45 13.13 15.1 19.78 18.86
London 29.31 5.45 6.28 8.71 14.17 27.45 20.95 22.85 27.2 27.33
Moscow 34.61 8.02 8.37 7.82 11.63 51.18 38.99 41.96 50.68 41.58
Paris 37.93 10.77 13.12 10.67 14.07 56.04 47.12 51.83 55.93 48.03
Rome 22.26 6.61 7.68 7.05 14.81 32.52 29.2 27.8 33.99 30.13
Sa˜opaolo 32.4 4.43 4.59 5.22 6.23 47.09 33.19 32.08 47.46 33.85
Sydney 32.15 8.74 9.49 6.61 18.53 46.45 37.26 35.74 49.14 26.15
Taipei 27.59 10.92 13.55 11.71 20.31 39.35 36.03 40.41 38.21 35.37
right parts of the table, correspondingly). Columns marked as RV (RL) give A
for the attacks at which nodes (links) were chosen at random, these numbers can
be compared with the outcome of attacks made according to the initially prepared
sequences of nodes (links) ordered by decreasing degrees (ki, ki,(l)) and betweenness
centralities (CiB, C
i,(l)
B ). For the last four scenarios these indicators were recalculated
after each step of the attack, and the corresponding results are given in columns
marked as k, k(l) and CB, C
(l)
B .
With the data of table 2 at hand, it is easy to compare the robustness of a given
PTN to attacks of different scenarios as well as to compare the robustness of different
PTNs. Assuming that the most stable PTNs are those characterized by larger values
of A one may conclude from the table, that for the node-targeted attacks the most
harmful appear to be attacks targeted either on the nodes of highest degree (PTN
of Berlin, Dallas, Du¨sseldorf, Hamburg, Istanbul, London, Rome, Sao˜paolo, and
Taipei) or on the nodes of highest betweenness centrality (Hong Kong, Moscow,
Paris, Sydney). Another observation is that attacks performed according to the
lists of nodes recalculated after each step of the attack scenario appear to be more
effective than those performed according to the lists prepared prior to the attack.
Moreover, this difference is much more pronounced for the highest betweenness
centrality targeted nodes as for those with highest node degree.
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On the other hand, for link-targeted attacks the most effective appear to be the
highest link degree targeted attacks according to the recalculated (PTN of Berlin,
Dallas, Du¨sseldorf, Istanbul, London, Moscow, Paris) or initial (Rome, Sao˜paolo)
lists of links. Only for the PTN of Hamburg, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Sydney the
highest betweenness centrality scenario appears to be the most effective, however
even in this case the difference between different scenarios is not much pronounced.
This similarity in behaviour for ’initial’ and ’recalculated’ scenarios seems to be
an intrinsic feature of the link-targeted attacks. Moreover, as we noticed before,
sometimes the ’initial’ approach occurs to be more effective. It is interesting to
mention that for three PTN (Hamburg, Istanbul, Sydney) which are not very re-
silient against any kind of attacks (however not for PTN of Dallas, which is least),
most efficient is the scenario of removing links with initial highest values of the
betweenness centrality C
i,(l)
B . It is worthwhile to note here, that the order of the
PTN according to their vulnerability under link-targeted attacks is similar to that
for the node-targeted scenarios, there are just few light shifts.
To further shed light on correlation between the network characteristics prior to
the attack and their stability during the attack we check correlation of A, Eq. (6),
for all PTN out of our database at different attack scenarios (table 2) with the value
of the Molloy-Reed parameters κ(k), Eq. (2), and κ(z), Eq. (4) of the unperturbed
networks, as given in Table 1. The results are displayed in Figs. 5. There we show the
value of A correlated with the Molloy-Reed parameters κ(z) (filled circles), and κ(k)
(open circles) of the same network for the node- and link-targeted attacks (left and
right columns, correspondingly). One notices two different regimes in the behavior of
the relation between A and κ for random and recalculated highest degree scenarios
both for node- and link-targeted attacks. First, A rapidly increases with an increase
of κ, then, in the second regime, when κ exceeds certain ’marginal’ value, there is no
pronounced correlation between A and κ any more, however still a weak increase of
A with κ is observed. These two regimes are observed both in A(κ(z)) and A(κ(k))
functions, however the behavior is more pronounced in A(κ(z)) plots (filled circles).
We show the linear fits for both regimes by solid lines in the figures. The region of
κ where the first regime is observed is 1 . κ(z) . 2 (2 . κ(k) . 4). Thus, if two
PTNs have initial values of corresponding Molloy-Reed parameters in this region,
it is very probable, that the PTN with higher value of κ will be essentially more
stable than the PTN with lower value of κ. However, the PTNs with the Molloy
Reed parameters κ(z) > 2 (κ(k) > 4) although in general being more stable than
those with lower κ do not differ substantially in their stability. A similar bahaviour
is observed for the link-targeted highest betweenness centrality attacks (Fig. 5 f)
but it is less pronounced, even less pronounced it is for the node-targeted highest
betweenness centrality attacks (Fig. 5 e), where almost no correlation between A
and κ is observed. To understand the origin of the particular sensitivity of PTN
stability for small values of κ, let us recall the results for uncorrelated networks
(see formulas (3), (5) and references in the text): a GCC in an infinite network can
exist only if κ exceeds the marginal value of κ(z) = 1 (κ(k) = 2). In the vicinity
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Fig. 5. Attacks on nodes (left column) and on links (right column). Correlation between A and
κ for the random (a, b), recalculated node degree (c, d) and recalculated betweenness (e, f)
scenarios. Results for κ(z) are shown by filled circles, results for κ(k) are shown by open circles.
Solid lines show linear fits of the corresponding data points.
of this marginal value the network is especially sensitive to even slight changes.
Obviously, the finiteness of the PTN and the correlation effects present there lead
to a variation for the criteria (3), (5), however a general sensitivity of network
stability to the changes in κ for small κ remains.
Another interesting observation is illustrated by Figs. 6. There, we show the
correlation of A with the mean node degree 〈k〉 for the random (a, b), recalculated
degree (c, d) and recalculated betweenness (e, f) scenarios. A generic feature of
the A(〈k〉) plots is the linear increase of A with increasing of 〈k〉 which is observed
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Fig. 6. Results of node targeted attacks (left column) and link targeted attacks (right column).
Correlation between A and 〈k〉 for (a, b) the random, (c, d) the recalculated degree and (e, f)
the recalculated betweenness scenarios.
for all values of 〈k〉 and for all three scenarios. A similar increase is observed both
for the node- and link-targeted attacks, c.f. Figs. 6 (a, c) and Figs. 6 (b, d),
however the linear approximation holds for the node-targeted attacks with less
accuracy and is almost useless for the highest betweenness centrality plots, Fig.
6 (e). The corresponding fits are shown by solid lines in the figures. The plots of
Figs. 6 demonstrate correlation of the network stability with the initial ’density’
of network constituents, nodes or links, without relation to the correlations in the
PTN structure. This is different to the plots of Fig. 5, where the correlations where
considered by analyzing the second moment of the node degree distribution 〈k2〉,
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that enters the Molloy-Reed parameter. Therefore, Fig. 6 shows the correlation
of the network stability measure A with the mean node degree, 〈k〉. There, for
both cases, within the expected scatter of data one observes clear evidence of an
increase of A with 〈k〉, i.e. networks with smaller mean node degree 〈k〉 break down
at smaller values of c and are thus more vulnerable to the attacks. Again, this
observation holds for the link-targeted attacks as well for the node-targeted attack
of random and recalculated highest degree scenarios.
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Fig. 7. Results of node targeted attacks. Correlation of A with respect to γ for (a) the random
and (b) the recalculated node degree scenarios. Filled circles correspond to the PTNs with more
pronounced power-law decay of the node-degree distribution, open circles correspond to the PTNs
where the power-law decay is less pronounced (see the section 2).
For the node-targeted attacks on scale-free networks it is useful also to check
the correlation between the node degree distribution exponent γ, Eq. (7) and the
stability measure A. Analytic results for infinite scale-free networks as well as em-
pirical observations for numerous real-world scale-free networks have confirmed a
particular stability of scale-free networks: there is no percolation threshold for ex-
ponents γ ≤ 3 [9, 10]. As we have observed in the previous studies [19] some of
the PTNs under consideration are scale-free: their node-degree distributions have
been fitted to a power-law decay (7) with the exponents shown in Table 1. Others
are characterized rather by an exponential decay, but up to a certain accuracy they
can also be approximated by a power-law behavior (then, the corresponding expo-
nent is shown in Table 1 in brackets). In Fig. 7a and 7b we show the correlation
between the fitted node-degree distribution exponent γ and A for the random and
recalculated node degree scenarios. One observes a notable tendency to find PTNs
with smaller values of γ to be more resilient as indicated by larger values of A.
This tendency holds even if we include the PTNs which are better described by the
exponential decay of the node-degree distributions.
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6. Conclusions and outlook
In this paper we have presented an empirical analysis of the reaction of PTNs of
different cities of the world upon random failure or directed attack scenarios. There
may be numerous reasons for individual failure, ranging from a random accident
to a targeted destruction. However, in accumulation these may lead to an emer-
gent behavior as a result of which the PTN ceases to function. On the one hand
our analysis is motivated by practical interest in the stability of individual PTNs
thereby comparing the operating features of different PTNs. On the other hand we
were seeking to identify criteria, which allow to judge a priori on the attack sta-
bility of real world correlated networks of finite size checking how do these criteria
correspond to the analytic results available for the infinite uncorrelated networks.
To perform the present analysis we have used previously accumulated [19] data
on PTNs of several major cities of the world (see table 1) and simulated attacks
of different scenarios targeted on the PTN nodes and links. To quantify the PTN
stability to attacks of different scenarios we use a recently introduced [16, 17] nu-
merical measure of network robustness. In our case, this measure is defined as the
area below curve described by the normalized size S(c) of the largest connected
component as function of the share c of removed nodes. In this respect, the mea-
sure captures the overall resilient behavior over the complete attack sequence. Table
2 allows to compare the robustness of a given PTN to attacks of different scenarios
as well as to compare the relative robustness of different PTNs.
The comparison of PTN characteristics measured prior to the attack with the
PTN robustness monitoring its behaviour during the attack allowed us to propose
criteria that allow an a priori estimate of PTN robustness and stability with re-
spect to an attack. This stability is indicated by a high value of the Molloy-Reed
parameters κ(k), Eq. (2), and κ(z), Eq. (4) as well as by the high value of the mean
node degree 〈k〉 of the unperturbed networks. Moreover, if the PTN node degree
distribution manifests a power-law decay, we have observed a notable tendency to
find PTNs with smaller values of γ to be more stable.
Acknowledgments
BB, CvF, and YuH acknowledge partial support by the FP7 EU IRSES project
N269139 ’Dynamics and Cooperative Phenomena in Complex Physical and Biologi-
cal Media’. This work was in part performed in frames of the COST Action MP0801
’Physics of Competition and Conflicts’.
References
[1] Albert, R. and Baraba´si, A.-L., Rev. Mod. Phys. 74 (2002) 47; Dorogovtsev, S. N. and
Mendes, J. F. F., Adv. Phys. 51 (2002) 1079; Newman, M. E. J., SIAM Review 45
(2003) 167; Dorogovtsev, S. N. and Mendes, J. F. F., Evolution of Networks (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2003).
July 31, 2018 6:49 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE berche˙et˙al
Transportation Network Stability: a Case Study of City Traffic 17
[2] Essam, J. W., Rep. Prog. Phys. 43 (1980) 833; Stauffer, D. and Aharony A., Intro-
duction to Percolation Theory (Taylor & Francis, London, 1991).
[3] Dorogovtsev, S. N., Goltsev, A. V., and Mendes, J. F. F., Rev. Mod. Phys. 80 (2008)
1275.
[4] Albert, R., Jeong, H., and Baraba´si, A.-L., Nature (London) 406 (2000) 378.
[5] Tu, Y., Nature (London) 406 (2000) 353.
[6] Jeong, H., Tombor, B., Albert, R., Oltvai, Z. N., and Baraba´si, A.-L.,Nature (London)
407 (2000) 651.
[7] Sole´, R. V., Montoya, J. M., Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 268 (2001) 2039.
[8] Jeong, H., Mason, S. P., Baraba´si A.-L., and Oltvai Z. N., Nature (London) 411
(2001) 41.
[9] Cohen, R., Erez, K., ben-Avraham, D., and Havlin, S., Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 (2000)
4626.
[10] Callaway, D. S., Newman, M. E. J., Strogatz, S. H., and Watts, D. J., Phys. Rev.
Lett. 85 (2000) 5468.
[11] Baraba´si, A.-L. and Albert, R., Science 286 (1999) 509; Baraba´si, A.-L., Albert, R.,
and Jeong, H., Physica A 272 (1999) 173.
[12] Broder, A., Kumar, R., Maghoul, F., Raghavan, P., Rajagopalan, S., Stata, R.,
Tomkins, A., and Wiener, J., Comput. Netw. 33 (2000) 309.
[13] Girvan, M. and Newman, M. E. J., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 99 (2002) 7821.
[14] Holme, P., Kim, B. J., Yoon, C. N., and Han, S. K., Phys. Rev. E 65 (2002) 056109.
[15] Molloy M. and Reed B. A., Random Struct. Algorithms 6 (1995) 161; Molloy, M. and
Reed, B., Combinatorics, Probability and Computing 7 (1998) 295.
[16] Schneider, C. M, Mihaljev T., Havlin, S., and Herrmann, H. J., Restrainig epidemics
by improving immunization strategies, preprint arXiv:1102.1929v1 (2011).
[17] Schneider, C. M, Moreira, A. A., Andrade, Jr., J. S., Havlin, S., and Herrmann, H. J.,
PNAS 108 (2011) 3838.
[18] Berche, B., von Ferber, C., Holovatch, T., and Holovatch, Yu., Eur. Phys. J. B 71
(2009) 125.
[19] von Ferber, C., Holovatch, T., Holovatch, Yu., and Palchykov, V., Eur. Phys. J. B
68 (2009) 261.
[20] von Ferber, C., Holovatch, T., and Holovatch, Yu., in Traffic and Granular Flow’07,
eds. Appert-Rolland, C., Chevoir, F., Gondret, P., Lassarre, S., Lebacque, J.-P., and
Schreckenberg, M. (Springer, 2009), pp. 721-732 (arXiv:0709.3206).
[21] Berche, B., von Ferber, C., Holovatch, T., and Holovatch, Yu., Dynamics of Socio-
Economic Systems 2 (2010) 42.
[22] Holovatch, T., Complex Transportation Networks: Resilience, Modelling and Optimi-
sation, Ph.D. thesis, Nancy University, France & University of Coventry, GB (2011).
http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00652784/fr/
[23] Marchiori, M. and Latora V., Physica A 285 (2000) 539; Latora, V. and Marchiori,
M., Phys. Rev. Lett. 87 (2001) 198701; Latora, V. and Marchiori M., Physica A
314 (2002) 109; Seaton, K. A. and Hackett, L. M., Physica A 339 (2004) 635; von
Ferber, C., Holovatch, Yu., and Palchykov, V., Condens. Matter Phys. 8 (2005) 225;
Sienkiewicz, J. and Holyst, J. A., Phys. Rev. E 72 (2005) 046127; Sienkiewicz, J.,
and Holyst, J. A., Acta Phys. Polonica B 36 (2005) 1771.
[24] Angeloudis, P. and Fisk, D., Physica A 367 (2006) 553; Zhang, P.-P., Chen, K., He,
Y., Zhou, T., Su, B.-B., Jin, Y., Chang, H., Zhou, Y.-P., Sun, L.-C., Wang, B.-H., and
He, D.-R., Physica A 360 (2006) 599; von Ferber, C., Holovatch, T., Holovatch, Yu.,
and Palchykov, V. Physica A 380 (2007) 585; Xu, X., Hu, J., Liu, F., and Liu, L.,
Physica A 374 (2007) 441; Chang, H., Su, B.-B., Zhou, Y.-P., and He, D.-R., Physica
July 31, 2018 6:49 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE berche˙et˙al
18 B. Berche, C. von Ferber, T. Holovatch, Yu. Holovatch
A 383 (2007) 687; Hu, M.-B., Jiang, R., Wu, Y.-H., Wang, W.-X., Wu, Q.-S., Eur.
Phys. J. B 63 (2008) 127; Zhu, Z.-T., Zhou, J., Li, P., Chen, X.-G., Chinese Physics
B 17 (2008) 2874; von Ferber, C., Holovatch, T., Holovatch, Yu., and Palchykov,
V., in Traffic and Granular Flow’07, eds. Appert-Rolland, C., Chevoir, F., Gondret,
P., Lassarre, S., Lebacque, J.-P., and Schreckenberg, M. (Springer, 2009), pp. 709-
720 (arXiv:0709.3203); Derrible, S. and Kennedy, C., Transportation 37 (2010) 275;
Derrible, S. and Kennedy, C., Physica A 389 (2010) 3678; Derrible, S. and Kennedy,
C., Transport Reviews (2011) 1-25.
